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Introduction
Pressure by NATO governments for negotiations which might 
lead to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe 
has, since 1968, constituted what has probably been their major 
public response to previous and subsequent pressure by the 
Soviet Union and its European allies for a conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe (CSCE). In the minds of many in 
Western Europe and North America, the two proposals have become 
intertwined. Views differ on the exact form which their 
relationship should take. Essentially, however, an MBFR 
negotiation has been represented within NATO as complementary 
to the proposed CSCE: adding substance to it, giving it 
practical significance or merely rendering it less unpalatable. 
It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that, in any of its 
detailed forms, that view is an erroneous one. Far from being 
automatically complementary to, or supportive of, an effort 
to improve European security, the attempt to negotiate MBFR 
may impede and distort it, may create unnecessary and damaging 
tension within the Western alliance, and may indirectly serve 
Soviet interests in Eastern Europe.
The ultimate purpose of MBFR is said to be "to achieve 
a more stable East-West military balance in Europe at lower 
force levels."*  Even a cursory examination, however, reveals 
*Arms Control Report (11th Annual Report to the Congress of the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1972), p. 25. 
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that at least four other motives have influenced those governments 
proposing an MBFR negotiation:
(1) the need to find a diplomatic counter to Warsaw 
Pact pressure for a CSCE, which is seen as an 
attempt both to obtain the diplomatic limelight 
and to drive wedges into the Western alliance;
(2) the associated desire to put the Soviet Government 
on the diplomatic defensive by focusing attention 
upon the size of Soviet conventional forces in 
Eastern Europe (including especially Czechoslovakia) 
and the extent to which they are allegedly required 
to enforce Soviet will within the Warsaw Pact;
(3) the desire to contain and, if possible, redress 
the alleged imbalance of conventional military 
strength in Europe, which has been said to favour 
the Warsaw Pact and which, it is feared, may do
so still more if pressures for the further reduction 
of NATO defence budgets become irresistible;
(4) the need to oppose, or at least control, pressure 
for the unilateral reduction of fprces by members
of the Western alliance with troops in Europe, with 
particular reference to pressure for the further 
withdrawal of American troops from the European area.
At different times and in different minds, these motives have 
possessed different degrees of relative importance. Those which 
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refer principally to the East-West diplomatic context ((1) and
(2) above) have had a significant effect upon the timing and 
phrasing of public initiatives by NATO. Those which relate 
rather to some version or other of the military "balance" in 
Europe ((3) and (4) above) have carried particular weight in 
the minds of individual West European governments, and especially 
of the government in Bonn. In particular, the desire to defend 
themselves, by this and other means, against the threat of 
large-scale U.S. troop withdrawals and the potential impact 
of the Mansfield Resolution has seemed to provide a number of 
West European governments with their primary interest in the 
MBFR proposal. It would not be too much to say that, to some 
of them, MBFR is attractive not as an adjunct to any process 
of European security negotiation but as the only apparent antidote 
to unilateral force reductions by the United States.
♦
This confusion of motives, with the associated intermingling 
of public policies and private hopes, has made it possible, 
within NATO, to represent the negotiation of MBFR as a process 
which can offer almost all things to almost all men. To the 
diplomatists, it offers an area for bargaining in which the 
West has seized, and can presumably hold, the initiative. To 
the arms controllers, it offers a means of restoring substance 
to the discussion of arms limitation in Europe, in a manner 
which seems more realistic than many of the earlier proposals 
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for demilitarization, denuclearization or the inhibition of 
surprise attack. To the military experts, it offers a way of 
curbing the freedom of the Soviet Union to move additional 
components of its very large conventional forces into Central 
Europe. To the politicians, it offers an ostensibly intelligible 
goal whose enunciation carries all the desirable overtones of 
"peace," "security" and "economy." To West Europeans in general, 
it offers a chance to feel that they are somehow directly 
involved in the process of strategic bargaining between East 
and West, which might otherwise, in SALT and elsewhere, become 
the implicit prerogative of the super-powers alone.
Above all, to President Nixon, MBFR offers an opportunity 
to justify opposition to Congressional pressure for the pre-
I
cipitable reduction of U.S. troop levels in Europe. By contending 
that the West European members of NATO were actually increasing
, I
their own defence efforts and that, in those circumstances, it 
would be unreasonable to pre-empt an MBFR negotiation by reducing 
U.S. forces unilaterally, the President was able to achieve 
sufficient domestic political support for his pledge to NATO 
in December 1970 that "given a similar approach by our allies, 
the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe 
and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries."*  
*U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's; Building for Peace (A Report 
to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States,
February 25, 1971), p. 36.
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In 1970 and again in 1971, pointing to the NATO initiatives on 
MBFR clearly strengthened the President's hand in dealing with 
Congressional attempts, focused upon the Mansfield Resolution, 
to impose further troop withdrawals from Europe. To many West 
European leaders, it has seemed unnecessary to look beyond that 
for a justification of the MBFR proposal itself.
It has to be recorded that this enthusiasm for MBFR 
negotiations has not been shared by East European governments 
and has been something less than unanimous even amongst those 
European countries which lie outside the Warsaw Pact. Few of 
the non-aligned European states have shown any great interest 
in MBFR, largely because they have felt themselves to be excluded 
in advance from negotiations so clearly, if implicitly, of an 
"inter-bloc” character. Some European states have stepped beyond 
apathy in the direction of opposition. Yugoslav officials, for 
example, have reportedly expressed private fears about the 
possibility that all or most U.S. forces might eventually be 
withdrawn from Europe as part of an agreement which left Soviet 
strength still poised perilously close to their own land and 
sea frontiers.
More publicly, French ministers, echoing the now traditional 
French objections to "inter-bloc" procedures, have recorded an 
opposition to MBFR negotiations which is no less definitive for 
being couched in sometimes Delphic terms. Both the Foreign
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Minister, M. Schumann, and the Defence Minister, M. Debre, have 
referred to the possibility that an MBFR agreement, applied 
primarily, if not exclusively, to the area of the two Germanies, 
would establish an undesirable "zone of difference" within 
Europe—by which they seem to mean that the segregation of 
German and neighbouring territory for arms control purposes 
could only complicate intra-European politics, impede genuine 
European integration and hinder full East-West detente. In 
private, individuals close to the French Government have been 
heard to suggest that, by forcing the inhabitants of such a 
"zone of difference" together, as common proprietors of a unique 
situation, an MBFR agreement might actually promote--and be 
designed to promote—the ultimate reunification of Germany.
In any case, for whatever reasons, the French Government has 
moved into a position in diametrical contrast to that of its 
NATO allies, in which it actively welcomes the idea of a CSCE 
while as actively questioning the wisdom and utility of an effort 
to negotiate MBFR.
The presentation of objections such as those voiced in Paris 
has the great merit that it demands a reasoned defence of MBFR 
proposals, which seem otherwise to have been in danger of mute 
acceptance as a self-evident good, akin to "peace" or "freedom." 
Such a defence has hardly yet been forthcoming in any terms 
higher than those of platitude. Eventually, however, it must 
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presumably be provided, if only because of the need to convince 
a recalcitrant minority in Paris, in Belgrade and in a few other 
European capitals. When that happens, it will be necessary for 
the proponents of MBFR to argue their case, publicly and 
privately, under at least three major headings:
(a) the effect of MBFR upon political-military 
relations within the Western alliance;
(b) the effect of MBFR upon political-military 
relations between East and West in Europe;
(c) the effect of MBFR upon the broader process 
of security reinforcement within the European 
environment as a whole.
Those are the main issues which will therefore be addressed in 
the remainder of this paper. They will not, however, be addressed 
with reference to any idea of MBFR as a single, indivisible 
process. It is, or should be, a commonplace of diplomacy that 
the effects of any proposal for the inter-state negotiation of 
an international agreement fall to be considered in at least 
three separate categories: the impact of the proposal, the 
impact of the process of negotiation (including the impact of 
any inter-governmental preparation for negotiation) and the impact 
of any eventual agreement. In the case of MBFR, there seems to 
have been a deplorable tendency, at least in public statements, 
to telescope and confuse these three fundamentally distinct 
elements and to assume, for example, that, because the initial
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NATO proposal of an MBFR negotiation has alledgedly yielded 
useful dividends, those dividends can only be increased as 
negotiations begin and proceed—or that, because an agreement 
on MBFR offers apparent advantages, the pursuit of such an agree­
ment through any available process of negotiation represents an 
automatically advantageous course.
It might be wise for potential negotiators in the West to 
reflect upon the fact that Soviet diplomatic method is one of 
the few which, in recent years, has shown a sensitive awareness 
of the basic differences between proposal, negotiation and 
agreement and of the possible dangers associated with treating 
those three activities as necessarily interdependent. The 
Soviet Union has, on occasion, been able to draw international 
dividends from public proposals which might have been dissipated 
if those proposals had even led to negotiations, just as it has 
been able to gain advantage from negotiations which have never 
led—and may never have been intended to lead—to agreement. Few 
Western countries have shown a parallel sophistication.
The main focus in this paper will, in fact, be on the middle 
I
element in the triad mentioned above: the actual process of 
MBFR negotiation and its potential effects. Inevitably, comments 
will be made on initial proposals, which are past history, and 
on possible agreements, which are long-range speculation. It 
should be clear, however, that judgements concerning any one of 
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the three elements or stages—proposal, negotiation and 
agreement—are not meant to be extrapolated to cover any other 
element unless that intention is made explicit.
What should also be made clear are certain general assump­
tions concerning the context within which any discussion of 
MBFR must proceed. The defence of these lies outside the scope 
of this essay; they can therefore be stated briefly by asserting:
(a) that the relaxation of East-West tension and 
the associated reinforcement of the security 
of the European environment as a whole are 
desirable objectives which it is reasonable 
and possible to pursue;
(b) that, in the context of East-West relaxation and 
of security reinforcement, it will be possible 
to reduce substantially the organized potential 
for military action now existing in Europe without 
thereby threatening the legitimate interests of 
any European or non-European state.
MBFR Negotiations and the Western Alliance
For 23 years, NATO governments have failed, in one way or 
another, to agree upon the scale and form of the military forces 
to be deployed in defence of Western Europe. On the one hand, 
disagreement about what is desirable has been chronic. Arguments 
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concerning the optimum balance between nuclear and conventional 
strength have continued, and still continue, without abatement, 
as do parallel arguments about the design and deployment of 
both nuclear and conventional forces. On the other hand, even 
those aspects of NATO's military posture on which agreement in 
principle has been forged have shown painfully little inclination 
to conform to such agreements in practice. The constant unwill­
ingness or inability of most NATO governments to provide the 
forces called for in agreed SHAPE plans has become notorious. 
With few and partial exceptions, governments have been unwilling 
to commit to the integrated defence structure of the alliance 
forces whose quality and quantity have matched the optimum 
requirements stated by NATO commanders and endorsed by NATO 
ministers. In general, the forces deployed have only reached 
agreed standards, in numbers, equipment, training and location, 
when those standards have been relaxed, by political decisions, 
in order to conform to the prevailing reality.
These facts should not be taken to prove ineptitude on the 
part of NATO governments. An extraordinary degree of energy 
and talent has been devoted to the negotiation of NATO force 
plans. Understandably, however, energy and talent have never 
entirely concealed the fundamental differences of attitude and 
judgement which have always existed, and will always exist, within 
the alliance. This is not the place to explore, or even enunciate, 
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all those differences in detail. It is important, however, to 
indicate how deeply they run.
In the first place, there are differences of underlying 
attitude between the United States and its European allies—and 
to a lesser extent between West European governments—concerning 
the proper role of nuclear weapons in West European defence and 
its relation to the role of conventional forces. In the crudest 
possible terms, this noils down to the difference between the 
general assumption of West Europeans that nuclear weapons are 
exclusively destined to deter the initiation of war and the 
characteristically American view that, at least in Europe, 
appropriate nuclear weapons can provide a reasonable and 
effective instrument with which to fight a war. Despite the 
intellectual igenuity now embalmed in the formal NATO doctrine 
of flexible response, that basic ambivalence has never been 
overcome.
In the second place, there are the closely associated 
differences concerning the extent to which a Soviet attack on 
Western Europe must be seen as an attack upon a value so central 
to American security itself as to be effectively covered by the 
U.S. strategic deterrent. Again, this is largely, but not 
exclusively, a transatlantic issue. It is not, however, only 
a conceptual issue; the extent to which Western Europe is or 
is not felt to fall within the coverage of the U.S. strategic 
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deterrent has an obvious impact upon the extent to which Western 
Europe feels impelled to construct and maintain both conventional 
and nuclear forces adequate to its own defence. For its part, 
the United States has always been trapped in a dilemma. It 
has had no desire, at least in the past, to encourage the pro­
liferation or expansion of West European nuclear forces, and has 
been at pains, therefore, to demonstrate their redundency by 
arguing that its own strategic deterrent is fully effective 
in a European context. At the same time, it has been most anxious 
to encourage the reinforcement of West European conventional 
strength, for which reason it has had to argue that the conven­
tional forces of its allies should be strong enough to withstand 
an all-out Soviet attack for at least a limited period—a 
requirement which assumes that the U.S. strategic deterrent 
may fail either to prevent such an attack or to retaliate if 
it occurs. It goes without saying that any substantial withdrawal 
of American troops from Europe may be widely interpreted in West 
European capitals as diminishing the credibility of the U.S. 
nuclear guarantee—to an even greater extent than it is seen 
to reduce NATO's conventional capability—and that, in those 
circumstances, it must become increasingly difficult to gloss 
over this particular inconsistency.
That points, in turn, to a third underlying difference of 
view within NATO: the difference which relates to the actual 
utility of U.S. conventional forces in Europe. These units have 
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traditionally combined the roles of hostage and bastion. The 
combination has never been a comfortable one. Moreover, it 
contains ambiguities which have yet to be resolved and which 
may very well become more acute in the context of force reduc­
tions. To the extent that U.S. forces are to be considered 
as a bastion—as an instrument for the conventional defence 
of West European territory—their deployment is, to use a 
cautious term, anomalous. NATO planning has always assumed that 
any major Warsaw Pact attack would have its main axis of advance 
across the North German plain towards the Rhine. The U.S. 
Seventh Army, without exception, is deployed far to the south 
of that line, and even the most optimistic assessment of its 
potential mobility gives it little chance of moving its major 
units far enough or fast enough to the north to meet an attack 
launched without substantial warning. In such circumstances, 
it is hard to regard it as the first bastion of West European 
territorial integrity. Understandably, therefore, heavy emphasis 
has been laid upon its hostage role: both in particular terms, 
as a national value which adds critical credibility to the 
American commitment to retaliate with nuclear weapons if Western 
Europe is attacked, and more generally, as an inescapable reason 
for the United States to remain psychologically involved in the 
defence of Western Europe.
Obviously, there is neither a precise level of strength 
below which U.S. forces become objectively incapable of playing 
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a hostage role in Europe nor a direct, proportional relationship 
between their strength and U.S. deterrent credibility; U.S. 
troop strength in Europe has already fallen gradually to some 
25 per cent below its high point of over 400,000 without any 
apparently commensurate decline in its perceived hostage utility. 
At the same time, it is equally obvious that a comparably large 
but more rapid reduction in the U.S. force level would probably 
be taken as a significant signal of American intentions with 
regard to the defence of Western Europe and the deterrence of 
Soviet attack. The pace and direction of such a change would 
arguably have as much impact, from this point of view, as its 
scale. More importantly, the political context within which 
such a change occurred would colour the interpretation placed 
upon it. At a time such as the present, when the external 
military commitments of the United States are generally under 
pressure and when its political and, especially, economic relations 
with Western Europe are more than usually tense, West Europeans 
would inevitably be particularly sensitive to even ambiguous 
evidence of a weakening American guarantee.
It is for this reason that one of the more troublesome 
issues within any MBFR negotiation is likely to be the distinction 
between "stationed" and "indigenous" forces. On the one hand, 
the removal of extraneous, "stationed" forces from any zone of 
limitation is one of the more obvious approaches to an overall 
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reduction of strength. On the other hand, removing "stationed" 
American forces from the zone is tantamount to the removal of a 
double valud: hostages as well as warriors. Already, the West 
European fear of that contingency is reflected in part in the 
nervous condemnation of any tendency towards a bilateral, 
Soviet-American negotiation over MBFR, the outcome of which 
would presumably bear heavily upon "stationed" forces alone.
Finally, there are the differences which have consistently 
existed within NATO—and as much between its European members 
as between them and the United States—concerning those strategic 
and tactical concepts which determine the design and deployment 
of conventional forces within Europe. The United States, Britain 
and West Germany, for example, have adopted and implemented a 
strategy of forward defence, expressly intended to hold as much 
of West German territory as possible in the face of any attack, 
while France, for example, has shown little inclination to 
follow suit, apparently preferring to regard some part of German 
territory as the necessary glacis area on which a battle for 
France itself might be fought. The political implications of 
such divergences aside, they have a particular effect upon one 
issue of central importance to systematic force reductions: the 
relative value of different military formations and weapons. 
The relative values attached to tanks, tactical aircraft or 
particular missiles, for example, may depend heavily upon the 
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military doctrine with which they are associated. Without 
agreement on doctrine between members of the Western alliance, 
agreement on such bargaining values for use within an MBFR 
negotiation will inevitably be harder to obtain.
In terms of relationships at this intra-alliance level, 
neither the MBFR proposal nor any step towards its implementation 
has yet had a major impact upon such doctrinal disputes as 
those outlined above. Indeed, the possible impact of MBFR 
negotiations within the Western alliance has, in general, been 
overshadowed by the perceived impact of the MBFR proposal upon 
just one apparently urgent, practical issue of intra-alliance 
relations which, although it touches upon almost every major 
doctrinal problem, has been largely considered in isolation: 
the issue of U.S. troop levels in Europe. In that area, the 
effect of the MBFR proposal has so far been broadly as intended: 
to give President Nixon one of the weapons he needed for his 
joust with Senator Mansfield. Equipped also with the other— 
the European Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP)—he has held 
off his Congressional assailants in two successive years.
There is an understandable scepticism about any President's 
ability to continue in this way for much longer. Most bargaining 
assets diminish in value over time, especially when they are 
both intangible and promissory, and it would be as rash to 
suppose that mere reference to the MBFR proposal will remain 
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indefinitely potent in the Congress as it would to assume that 
West European governments (which, in this connection, means the 
governments in Bonn and London) will indefinitely be able and 
willing to add fresh increments to their annual defence budgets. 
Those two factors were apparently effective on Capitol Hill 
in 1970. In 1971, their effect already seemed to be waning, 
and the Administration might have faced a much harder struggle 
had it not received such timely and influential assistance as 
that provided by the Soviet Government, in the form of Mr. Brezhnev's 
brusque but unambiguous acceptance of the MBFR idea in his report 
to the 24th Party Congress and in his subsequent speech at 
Tbilisi. The combination of these disparate factors may again 
prove powerful enough to tip the Washington balance in 1972, 
especially if overt progress in SALT regenerates faith in the 
potential for East-West arms control. By 1973, however, it 
seems less likely that President Nixon or his successor will 
find the MBFR proposal—in isolation from any process of 
negotiation—of much remaining use in countering Congressional 
pressure for troop cuts in Europe; it will have served its purpose 
well, but serving that purpose for longer will depend upon 
progress with MBFR negotiations themselves.
A superficial judgement might suggest that what is therefore 
required in order to continue this type of support for the U.S. 
military presence in Europe is to ensure that, by 1973, there is 
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at least the imminent prospect of a substantial East-West 
negotiation on MBFR. If that prospect is evident—or a fortiori, 
if negotiations have begun—the U.S. Administration will be able 
to assert, with still greater force, the danger of pre-empting 
negotiating positions by cutting troop strength unilaterally. 
Moreover, for as long as negotiations continue, the President, 
whoever he is, will be able to maintain his opposition to any 
reduction which has not been matched by the Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, that judgement ignores not only the general 
difficulty of extrapolating from the impact of a negotiating 
proposal to the impact of a negotiation itself but also the 
particular fact that, although it has been possible to by-pass 
the major intra-alliance differences mentioned above in pre­
senting the MBFR proposal, it will be impossible to avoid them 
when it comes to actual negotiations on MBFR. Even if these 
differences can be kept out of an East-West negotiating forum 
(which, given the attitude of countries such as France, is unlikely), 
they can not be excluded from the negotiation between NATO 
governments which must precede and run in parallel with any 
East-West talks. Indeed, they will inevitably shape the agenda 
for such an intra-alliance negotiation. Just as SALT has shown 
that agreement between the super-powers demands prior agreement 
on both principles and details within each of their national 
bureaucracies, so an MBFR negotiation will have its site within 
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and between allied capitals as much as on any neutral ground 
between East and West.
It cannot be over-emphasized that, in the end, the ability 
of NATO governments to negotiate a substantial MBFR agreement 
with the Soviet Government and its allies—as opposed to indulging 
in the rhetoric of MBFR proposals—will depend upon their ability 
to agree amongst themselves not only about technical military 
details but also about such doctrinal issues as the role of U.S. 
nuclear weapons in Europe, the future status of the U.S. nuclear 
guarantee, the development of West European nuclear forces, the 
proper balance between U.S. and European conventional forces and 
the correct choice of strategic and tactical concepts for the 
European theatre.
The implicit optimism of many Western MBFR proponents on 
this score is astonishing, given that NATO leaders have reportedly 
failed to reach such agreement in the past, when time was less 
pressing and discussion more private. The fact of an East-West 
MBFR negotiation might, of course, spur them to extraordinary 
efforts and to unprecedented success. But there is little 
evidence from NATO's history to prove that it will, particularly 
as the Soviet Union can hardly be expected to turn its back on 
the opportunity to exploit differences within the Western alliance 
once negotiations are under way—differences which are likely to 
be enhanced in negotiating circumstances which, unlike current
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NATO deliberations on MBFR, demand the direct involvement of 
France. The Soviet Government may have accepted the idea of an 
MBFR negotiation, but its refusal to entertain Sig. Brosio in 
Moscow as the nominated representative of the idea's sponsors 
is an indication—if one were needed--that acceptance in 
principle does not mean the Soviet Union will be altruistically 
inclined to help NATO governments out of their own tactical 
difficulties, any more than they will be inclined to help Moscow 
in its parallel dealings with East European governments.
In these circumstances, the weakness of the superficial, 
optimistic view is self-evident. Although NATO governments, 
in part by acting without France, have presented an ostensibly 
united front in proposing MBFR, the Soviet Union, in addition 
to its obvious ability to influence the pace of further develop­
ments, will have ample opportunity in an active MBFR negotiation 
to exploit the deep underlying differences within the Western 
alliance, especially when the negotiation touches, as it must, 
upon those so-called "tactical" nuclear delivery systems which 
have been excluded from SALT and upon those "stationed" conven­
tional forces whose dual role, at least on the Western side, has 
already been noted. As that happens, not only will NATO 
governments face the continuing embarrassment of having their 
internal disputes aired in public but also the U.S. Administration 
will face the prospect of placing its influence with the U.S.
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Congress partially at the mercy of the Soviet Union, as well 
as of its own allies.
If the negotiations, in pace or direction, seem to reveal 
serious conflicts between the United States and the West European 
nations over defence policy--as well they may—and if the Soviet 
Union chooses to highlight these, either by playing upon them 
or by appearing to support the U.S. side of the argument, an 
American President could rapidly encounter great difficulty in 
pressing the Congress to delay further troop withdrawals from 
Europe in the interest of MBFR. At the extreme, the President 
might find himself seeming to resist an available agreement with 
the Soviet Union for the mutual withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet 
troops from Central Europe simply because of West European 
objections. The prospect for U.S.-West European political-military 
relations in circumstances such as those does not seem any more 
encouraging than the prospect for the indefinite maintenance of 
American troop strength at a level acceptable to West European 
governments.
That prognosis may seem gloomy, but it is not clearly 
unrealistic. After all, the underlying issues at stake in an 
MBFR negotiation—few of which have been relevant to the mere 
proposal so far made—include a number which have already proved 
seriously divisive within the Western alliance, contributing, 
for example, to the final withdrawal of French forces from the 
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integrated NATO structure in 1966. When divisions of this 
magnitude have emerged from private, relatively leisured discussions, 
confined to and controlled by close allies, it might well be 
regarded as naive to suppose that they can be resolved by trans­
posing the discussions into an inter-bloc negotiation with 
putative adversaries. For some years, NATO governments have 
been trying, with very limited success, to negotiate an intra­
Western "MBFR agreement"—balancing national cuts against each 
other and trying to hold U.S. withdrawals within tolerable limits.
In a sense, the NATO proposal for an East-West MBFR was as much 
a move in that intra-Western negotiation as in its overt and 
explicit context of detente. Now, some in the West seem to 
hope that an East-West negotiation may indirectly yield the fruit 
which intra-Western discussions have been so reluctant to bear. 
Unfortunately, it is easier to sympathize with that hope than 
to find grounds for it.
MBFR Negotiations and East-West Relations in Europe
Again, the emphasis here should be upon the effect of an
MBFR negotiation. Persistent NATO reiteration of the MBFR 
proposal has had its tactical impact in the East-West context, 
but that impact is necessarily diminishing. Much of its weight 
was extracted by the Soviet Government's acceptance of the 
proposal in principle. Some, of course, remained while the
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Soviet Union delayed the opening of exploratory talks, but that 
was the lesser part. With such talks now in prospect, the more 
important question is what impact the process of MBFR negotiation, 
as distinct from either previous proposal or subsequent agreement, 
is likely to have on the East-West relationship in Europe.
Given the number of countries involved and the variety of 
alternative MBFR possibilities, a detailed, country-by-country 
analysis of the impact of MBFR in this respect would, at this 
stage, be both over-speculative and over-ambitious. The central 
criticism of the role which an MBFR negotiation is likely to 
play in shaping East-West relations can, however, be stated 
briefly: that it is peculiarly calculated to check the diversi­
fication of European inter-state relationships and to press those 
relationships back into a bipolar mould, necessarily dominated 
by relations between the two super-powers, one non-European and 
the other, at most, quasi-European.
Some might, I suppose, consider that reversion to a more 
rigid, more predictable bipolarity should be welcomed, and that 
this is not, in fact, a criticism at all. Be that as it may, 
the grounds for the judgement itself are not difficult to find. 
The earlier discussion of the abortive attempts to reach a 
durable "MBFR agreement" within the Western alliance has revealed 
the extent to which that issue is dominated by, and focused upon, 
American military forces, serving as both hostage and bastion.
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Intra-Western "MBFR" has turned out to involve a set of problems 
which revolve around U.S. policies and actions. Clearly, the 
same is true, mutatis mutandis, within the Warsaw Pact. The 
critical issue there is Soviet military strength in the eastern 
part of Central Europe; whether the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
will accept any particular proposal for force reductions depends, 
above all, on whether the Soviet Union will regard the impact 
on its own military deployment as acceptable. Again, moreover, 
Soviet military forces are unique within the Eastern alliance, 
as American forces are in the West, by virtue of their relevance 
to more than one basic purpose. Just as U.S. military units, 
being hostages as well as warriors, must be evaluated in MBFR 
by standards separate from those applied to other NATO forces, 
so Soviet military units demand a standard of valuation unique 
within the Warsaw Pact: partly because they too may be thought 
to have a hostage utility, but even more because they must be seen 
to play a special part in ensuring the maintenance of ultimate 
Soviet political control within Eastern Europe as well as in 
defending that area against the West.
For these reasons, an East-West MBFR negotiation, whatever 
efforts are made to embrace the question of "indigenous" forces, 
will inevitably find itself giving primacy to the question of 
the "stationed" forces of the two super-powers—explicitly in 
terms of the balance between them, but implicitly also in terms 
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of their roles within their own alliances. Formally speaking, 
the super-powers will not be allowed by their allies, at least 
on the Western side, to negotiate bilaterally, simply because 
those allies have particular reasons for wishing to influence 
the absolute and relative valuation of super-power military 
forces. Nevertheless, the East-West negotiation, while multi­
lateral in form, must be largely bilateral in substance. Only 
if an agreement can be reached on the bilateral U.S.-Soviet 
balance in Europe will it become relevant to negotiate also on 
the balance between non-super-power military strengths in that 
area.
With this in mind, it becomes evident that an East-West
MBFR negotiation, far from being a simple process of inter-bloc 
bargaining, will in fact consist of at least three separate but 
parallel negotiations: a renewed, multilateral negotiation 
within the Western alliance (including France) concerning both 
specific force level questions and the chronic intra-alliance 
differences over doctrine, a formal, inter-bloc negotiation between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and an informal or even indirect--but 
inevitably more substantial--negotiation between the super-powers 
themselves.
The gap in that pattern is equally obvious: there is unlikely 
to be any substantial multilateral negotiation within the Warsaw 
Pact, at least as far as the disposition of Soviet military forces 
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in Europe is concerned. That is not to say that there will not 
be a process of active discussion between Warsaw Pact governments 
concerning tactics for use in the East-West MBFR forum. But it 
is to say that the East European members of the Warsaw Pact lack 
the ability, in the final analysis, to constrain the policies 
of the Soviet Government either in regard to its own troop deploy­
ments in Central Europe or in regard to its bargaining with the 
United States.
In these circumstances, the tendency of the MBFR negotiating 
process to force East-West relations in Europe back into a pre- 
dominanatly bipolar mould will bear particularly heavily upon the 
East European states who, in this context, will tend to be treated 
by all other parties as nothing more than Soviet puppets. What­
ever the superficial merits of that tendency from the NATO point 
of view—and it has, at least, the merit of crude simplicity—it 
is not calculated to encourage that development of a more 
independent diplomatic identity by East European states within 
the European context to which many West Europeans purport to attach 
some importance. Diplomatic, economic, technological and cultural 
negotiations between Eastern and Western components of the European 
continent have helped to reduce intra-bloc rigidities and to 
generate greater flexibility and resilience, especially in Eastern 
Europe; military negotiations, at least in the MBFR context, can 
only have a reverse effect, emphasizing again the politics of 
inter-bloc confrontation.
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The implications of this for East-West relations as a whole 
should not be under-estimated. A number of Western politicians 
and officials have couched their suspicion of the Soviet CSCE 
proposal in terms of the opportunity which it might provide for 
Moscow to obtain Western ratification of a status quo which 
includes its own political dominion over Eastern Europe. It is 
all the more ironical, and even tragic, that, in these circum­
stances, Western governments should have been responsible for 
promoting the idea of a negotiation the only clear characteristic 
of which is that it will provide a unique opportunity and incen­
tive for the re-assertion and acceptance of Soviet primacy in 
Eastern Europe. An agreement on MBFR which entailed a substantial 
reduction of Soviet military strength in that area might, in the 
long run, have a different effect. But the negotiation of MBFR 
will not. In striving to avoid a trap which they took the Soviet 
Union to be laying for them, with the object of reinforcing and 
legitimizing the Soviet empire, Western governments seem determined 
to walk backwards into a similar but deeper pit of their own 
digging.
i
MBFR Negotiations and the European Security Process
Much of what might be said under this heading is already 
implied in previous comments, and especially in the immediately 
preceding discussion of East-West relations. The implications 
should, at least, however, be made articulate.
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The process of improving security as a quality of the pan­
European environment is in no sense coterminous with the CSCE 
proposal or its implementation. A conference on European security 
and cooperation—or, as is far more likely, a series of confer­
ences and mini-conferences—will constitute only one, unusually 
formal stage in that process of revising the concept of security 
within Europe which is already in train. Other formal landmarks 
have included, so far, the Four-Power Berlin Agreement and the 
Soviet-West German and Polish-West German treaties. All such 
formal activity must, however, be seen as set into an informal 
matrix of changing assumptions and perceptions about the nature 
of security itself.
Ten years ago, "European security" meant "West European 
security" in Bonn or London and, presumably, "East European 
security" in Warsaw or Pankow; today, in any of those cities, 
it is accepted without hesitation as meaning the security of 
the European environment as a whole—not with any implication 
that confrontation is ended but with the implication that the 
security of East and West in Europe must now be regarded as 
interdependent. That largely unconscious change of usage is 
only the most obtrusive indication of a wide-ranging reformation 
of European perceptions, the overall tendency of which has been 
to move thought and action away from the simple premises of 
undifferentiated East-West confrontation. The confrontational 
frontier in Europe has not disappeared and will not, in any
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circumstances, do so for many years to come. But it has become 
more permeable and more functionally selective, allowing a 
degree of commercial, cultural and, above all, intellectual 
interpenetration which would have been inconceivable even a 
decade ago. And one product of that interpenetration has been 
a growing, if often tacit, recognition that security in Europe 
is a multi-dimensional concept, within which the perception of 
security as a direct product of sectional military strength is 
balanced by the perception of security as the quality of a 
situation in which both allies and adversaries co-exist.
By the "European security process," we have come, therefore, 
to mean the continued, if cautious, movement away from the 
brittle, rigid security of strength in confrontation and towards 
the more flexible, albeit more complex, security which emerges 
from the ability of an international situation to absorb 
salient pressures for change without any fundamental modification 
of its structure. While some European nations, in the East and 
the West, believed that others, with their super-power allies, 
sought a basic change in the structure of the European situation, 
there was no possibility of such movement. The precondition of 
the European security process which now occupies so much attention 
is that the East-West confrontation, however persistent as a 
phenomenon, should no longer be seen to reflect active, imminent 
and conflicting threats to impose structural change upon Europe. 
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For some time to come, a conviction of adequate military capability 
will continue to be an essential requirement on both sides of the 
established confrontational frontier. Apart from its direct role 
as an insurance against deliberate or accidental retrogression, 
military capability must provide one source of the underlying 
confidence without which European governments will not be willing 
to accept the risks inherent in exploring and promoting the 
recently unfamiliar idea of non-confrontational, pan-European 
security. But the context in which military strength is to be 
related to European security in its newly emergent sense is 
basically different from that in which military stength has, 
in the past, supported perceptions of separate, sectional securities 
in an era of acute confrontation. In particular, the concept of 
a military "balance" between East and West in Europe has ceased 
to embrace and reflect the concept of security as a whole.
What contribution the CSCE proposal, or any negotiation 
which follows from it, may make to the process of revising and 
broadening the European concept of security is still open to 
question. At best, it will do no more than codify or ratify 
some part of that process; it cannot generate or maintain it 
in isolation from other factors. At worst, however, it cannot 
apparently impede the process; it can only be irrelevant to it. 
But the same is not true of MBFR, of which it might be said that, 
at best, it may be irrelevant to the European security process 
while, at worst, it may impede, interrupt or even reverse it.
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In order to see the foundation for such a pessimistic 
assertion, we only have to consider the earlier comments in 
this paper. Whatever bearing the MBFR proposal has had on 
European security—and that bearing seems to have been indirect, 
tenuous and limited to relations within the Western alliance—an 
East-West negotiation on MBFR is bound to have a direct bearing, 
simply because it will force the negotiators back upon assump­
tions which have been relevant to exactly that undifferentiated 
confrontation from which the European security process is striving 
to escape. Apart from specific reasons for believing that this 
will, in fact, be the effect, there is a general reason indicated 
by the inclusion of the "B" in "MBFR"—and by the emphasis 
already laid upon its signification within NATO. "Balanced" 
force reductions can only be designed or negotiated on the 
assumption that a more or less exact relationship is to be 
established between the military strengths of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact within Central Europe. Behind that lies, of course, 
the further assumption that the creation and preservation of 
such a relationship is intrinsic to the achievement or mainten­
ance, by each of the negotiating blocs, of its own "security." 
In fact, the very idea of a "balance" is founded upon the concept 
of military confrontation and upon the concept of sectional 
security which goes with it.
Even if the negotiators of MBFR do not wish to re-emphasize 
such concepts as these, they will be unable to avoid doing so. 
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MBFR is explicitly related to the two great military alliances, 
rather than to Europe as a whole; in substance as well as in 
form, it is an affair of the blocs. Moreover, the issues which 
it raises are, as we have seen, exactly those whose discussion 
must entail a re-assertion of the primacy of the super-powers, 
together with a consequent polarization of their respective 
alliances. Finally, on a strictly practical level, the nego­
tiators of MBFR will have no way of assessing the "balance" 
which they are to discuss—and thus the merit of detailed 
proposals—other than in terms of hypothetical military action 
by one bloc against the other. Each side will necessarily be 
forced, in that connection, to assume that the other is the 
potential aggressor. The political and psychological effects 
of such an assumption aside, history provides all too much 
evidence that an arms control negotiation conducted on the 
basis of conflicting assumptions about intention and in the 
context of mirror-image offence/defence scenarios may generate 
a case, at best, for "freezing" forces or for restricting their 
growth but is more unlikely to produce a case for reducing them. 
In addition, reason itself provides the evidence for judging 
that, in the present context, a negotiation founded upon such 
premises much exert pressures on both policies and perceptions 
which are directly opposed to the allegedly desired trend of 
thinking about security in Europe.
-33-
Reason also points to another conclusion which sits 
uncomfortably with the idea of improving security within 
Europe as a whole. The MBFR proposal, in addition to its 
inter-bloc implications, is related exclusively to what is 
commonly described as the "central area" of Europe. Although 
the exact scope of the zone for restriction is obviously in 
doubt, it would certainly not include Scandinavia or the 
European nations of the Mediterranean littoral, and seems 
unlikely to include Britain and France in the West or Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Rumania in the East. The attempt to negotiate such 
an agreement, in addition to excluding the non-aligned European 
states, would thus tend to dissect the area which the European 
security process seeks to render more coherent and interdepen­
dent. There is nothing incompatible between the idea of a 
coherent European security environment and an emphasis on 
lesser regionalisms within Europe for other purposes or on 
other levels. There is, however, an intrinsic incompatibility 
between that former idea and the encouragement of a functional 
regionalism for the same purpose and on the same level, especially 
when the European history of the last 200 years has demonstrated 
the impracticability of isolating any sub-area within Europe for 
the purpose of a security settlement—whether that sub-area covers 
the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire or the two Germanies.
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Conclusion
None of the polemical comments made in this paper should be 
taken to imply ignorance of those arguments which have, from 
time to time and in somewhat piecemeal fashion, been advanced 
in favour of MBFR. Unfortunately, such arguments seem to have 
been accepted so far with a dangerous facility, despite the 
reasons stated here for judging that counter-arguments exist 
and should, perhaps, prevail. For that reason, one purpose of 
this paper has been to present these counter-arguments in terms 
which, without being exaggerated, may have some compensatory 
effect, even at the risk of apparent bias.
Still less should any of the comments made here be taken 
to imply opposition to the reduction of military forces in 
Europe. Indeed, as the assumptions initially stated should have 
indicated, exactly the reverse is true. The fact is that military 
forces have been reduced and are being reduced within Europe—not 
as the result of formal negotiation but as the result of changing 
perceptions. On the Western side, the United States, France, 
Britain, Canada and Belgium are amongst those which have made 
significant cuts in their defence efforts. However much those 
cuts may be explained, in terms of proximate cause, by financial 
stringency, it is fair to say that they would not have been made 
had the perception of defence needs and of security itself 
remained as it was in, say, 1962.
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That, in fact, is the manner in which it is reasonable to 
hope that further, substantial reductions of the military 
establishments in Europe can be achieved: by revising percep­
tions of security, and by allowing the effect of successive 
revisions to be felt in the modification of military efforts 
and deployments. The most fundamental criticism of MBFR may 
be that it threatens to supersede that delicate, slow but 
fundamentally reasonable process of interactive arms control 
and, in doing so, to inhibit rather than promote both the 
intelligent re-examination of security needs and the prudent 
reduction of military forces to the extent which such a re­
examination would permit.
By emphasizing the status of the blocs, by re-asserting 
the primacy of the super-powers, by subordinating the East 
European states to Moscow, by focusing upon a limited area 
of Central Europe alone and, above all, by assuming a view 
of security based upon undiluted confrontation, MBFR negotiations 
offer, in fact, to play a unique role in souring and distorting 
the process of prudent but progressive revision of the European 
security environment. There is no reason to suppose that their 
major sponsors have intended such an effect, or that they would 
do other than deplore it. No doubt, NATO governments, in 
proposing an MBFR negotiation, have wished not only to alleviate 
some of their own, short-term, intra-alliance problems—although 
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that may well have been their principal objective—but also to 
make a real contribution to the improvement of security in 
Europe. In this case, however, good intentions are irrelevant.
Whatever transient merit the MBFR proposal may have had— 
and whatever the real attractions of a substantial and well- 
designed reduction of forces might be—the effects of a formal 
MBFR negotiation are likely to be no more welcome to its sponsors 
than to others. Doctrinal differences within the Western 
alliance, many of them of dubious relevance to the 1970s, will 
be resurrected and exacerbated to an extent which may cause 
serious friction between the United States and its allies. The 
level of military strength in Europe is unlikely to be reduced 
more rapidly or more symmetrically than would otherwise be the 
case and, in some respects, may even be supported beyond its 
natural term. The Soviet Union, the only nation which might 
conceivably profit from an MBFR negotiation, will be encouraged 
and enabled to re-assert its dominant role within the Warsaw 
Pact. Above all, the implicit but almost atavistic reinforcement 
of those assumptions relevant to the sectional security of the 
1950s will confuse and hamper the prudent formulation of assump­
tions relevant to the sort of coherent, situational security 
which seems to be demanded by the Europe of the 1970s. Even with 
all of this, the charge against the sponsors of an MBFR negotiation 
should not be one of malice. But it might fairly be one of 
naivete.
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